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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
AMASA L Yl\IAN CLARK, also ( Case No.
known as A. L. CLARK,
11626
Deceased,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondent takes mild exception to some of the
statements made by appellant in its statement of facts.
There is no evidence to support the following recitals
on page 2 of appellant's brief:
"* * * had been a resident of Davis County
for many years and an outstanding citizen of
the community. He was one of the founders of
the Davis County Bank and had during his lifetime owned considerable stock in the bank. * * *
at the age of 103 years and a resident of Davis
County, State of Utah."
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In the same paragraph the statement is made:
"_Mr. Bird, the attorney for Dale D. Clal1
prepared this agreement (Tr. 36) ."
'
which statement is repeated at page 6 of the appellant,
brief. The testimony as to the document was at Tr. 3o:
"This is one of the drafts prepared by my attornev.
There was no testimony as to what other drafts w;re
prepared or how the particular one evolved.
At page 5 of appellant's brief is a statement that
after a colloquy about who should go forward with proof
the respondent "then" put in a copy of the agreement a1
an exhibit. The record discloses that Exhibit "A" wa1
offered by the attorney for the Estate (Tr. 3) and thal
the Estate also offered Exhibit "B" (Tr. 4, 24) and thai
respondent simply substituted the original of Exhibit
"A" for the copy offered by the Estate. (Tr. 3, 4)
Point 5 contains a premise of facts which are not
in evidence.
Appellant raises five points in his brief which re·
spondent will state affirmatively from the standpoint
of the decision and argue in this brief. Respondent also
raises a sixth point, which will be argued first, cha!·
lenging appellant's points I and 2 as having been not
timely raised.
POINTS OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
I. Utah's non-claim statute is not applicable

this proceeding.

2
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z. The issue of specific performance was properly
before the District Court.
8. The agreement for sale of stock is not illusory

and is not an option, but a binding agreement .

The agreement for sale of stock does not con1t[tute a gift.
.J<.

5. The agreement for sale of stock is not a testa-

mentary disposition.

Points 1 and 2 were not properly before the
District Court.
Ii.

ARGUMENT
POINT 6

POINTS 1 AND 2 \VERE NOT PROPERLY
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT.
The case came on for trial on May 9, 1969 on the
issues raised by the original Petition for Confirmation
uf Salt' (R-1,2), the "Objection" (R-4), the "Answer
to Objection" (R-6), the "Amended Objection" (R-8,
filed April 15, 1969) and the ruling of Judge Swan on
April 22, 1969 ( R-18, p. 5: "the Court could make an
order at this time that this is a proceeding to authorize
the executor to perform a contract entered into by the
deceased during his lifetime.") The Order is supplied
;,, a secolld supplement to the record and make the issue
of specific performance plain.
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On May 9 the Executor offered in evidence llie
agreement (Tr. 3) and then the appellants moved 1,
dismiss the proceeding because "no petition for any determination" had been filed by the respondent and aho
because "no claim has been filed with the estate" (Tr.
8, lines 17 and 22).
Respondent objected to both issues as not timelr
raised and not raised by the executor, whose right it
was to object (Tr. 11).
Judge Swan had fixed the issues for trial as beina
'
for specific performance over the objections in para·
graphs (a) to ( e) of the Amended Objections, paragraph (f) being stricken (R-18, p. 5, lines 26 to 29ol
the record of April 22 hearings) . See Finding of Fart
4, Conclusions of Law 5 and 6 (R-11 and 12).
Failure to file a claim could of course be raised al
the trial if jurisdictional.
POINT 1
UTAH'S NON-CLAIM STATUTE IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS PROCEEDING.
Respondents admit that where there are no special
circumstances and no facts taking the case out of 75·9·1
UCA 1953, the Utah cases hold that certain claims
must be presented within the time provided. The Utan
cases cited hold nothing more and involve no facts analo·
· · dell'·
gous to the facts of this case. In Re A nJewzer
Estate, 13 Utah 2d 378, 374, Pacific 2d 84.5, it was helu
4

that mailing to the wrong address was not a sufficient
filing and did not excuse filing; In Re Neff' s Estate,
8 Gtah 2d 368, 335 P .2d 403, stands for the proposition
that the pendency of an action at the time of death of
one of the parties is not a substitute for filing a claim
ill the estate; In Ile A gees Estates, 69 Utah 130, 252
P. 8Ul, it is held that an attorney has a lien against the
product of litigation conducted by him, and that even
though the funds are in the hands of the executor, the
lien applies and his action therefore is not barred by the
prorisious of the non-claim statute; in Halloran-Judge
1'rust Co. vs. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, it is
held that a contract to manage a building for ten years,
during which ten year period the owner died, had to be
filerl as a contingent claim and was barred under the
statute for non-filing.
The appellants also cite cases from Colorado, Washington and Idaho, and refer to annotations in 41 ALR
lH and 47 ALR 896. Lieber vs. Sherman, (Colorado
1954) 274 P.2d 816 simply holds that a lessor's claim
for rent was not an expense of administration and therefore required the filing of a claim; James vs. Corvin
(Washington 1935) 51 P .2d 689 simply holds that a
lessor must file a claim for rent not yet due against the
estate of a lessee. In Lundy vs. Lemp, (Idaho 1919)
179 P. 738, there was a contract to convey land which
had been partially paid when the grantor died. No
daim was filed and the court held that no action could
be maintained, the statute there requiring filing of "any
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claim against an estate." The statute is so broad
as to
be no precedent in this case.
In 41 ALR 144 where objectors say the cases ar

" co11ecte d" t h ere are no cases m
· point.

e

Respondents submit that with the death of AL.
Clark the rights reserved to A. L. Clark ceased and the·
stock belonged to Dale D. Clark, subject only to pay
ment of money.
·

It must be borne in mind that the executor here 11
making no objection to the delivery of the stock upon
payment of the funds (Tr. 18, lines 17 to 29, also Tr.
p. 2), and no issue as to filing a claim was raised o1·
the estate or by the objectors by their objections or preserved in the order of Judge Swan.
Respondent's position is that the executor is prepared to perform and has constantly indicated to respondent that it will perform and that the right of re·
spondent to the stock is not a claim required to be filell
(Tr. 12, lines 27 to 30; See also testimony of respondent,
Tr. 29 to 32).
This position has general support. In 31 Am. Jur
2d Title "Executors and Administrators" at Section 216
on page 143 this statement si made:
"Presentation of a claim or demand has been
held unnecessary in actions to quiet
real
or personal property, actions for spec1f1c pehr·
formance of a contract to convey, actions for I e
recovery of a specific property * * *"
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At Section 318 on page 158:

"Thus, it is not only within the power of an
executor or administrator to complete a contract
made by his decedent, it is his duty to carry out
the contract. If he fails to perform a contract
of his decedent which is binding on the estate,
he may be compelled to pay damages out of the
assets in his hands."

It is the position of respondent and evidently the
position of the executor and the District Court that
Dale Clark, having given valuable consideration to
A. L. Clark, which was received and acknowledged by
A. L. Clark, has purchased the bank stock, and has such
an interest that the estate does not have clear title and
the claim of Dale Clark is in the nature of an action for
specific performance, to declare a lien, or to compel delivery of the property. (Decree of Specific Performance R-13-14).

The non-claim statute (U.C.A. 75-9-4) concludes:
"Provided further, that nothing in this title
contained shall be so construed as to prohibit the
foreclosure of liens or mortgages as hereinafter
provided."
Section 75-9-11, after requiring that an action shall not
be maintained unless a claim is first filed then says:
"Except that an action may be brought without notice by any holder of a mortgage or lien to
enforce the same against the property of the estate subject thereto, where all recourse against
any other property of the estate is expressly
waived in the complaint * * *"

7

Thus it appears that an action for specific perfonu.
ance or to compel delivery of personal property is not ,
treated at all under the claim section of the statute b,u, '
appears in Chapter 11 of Title 75, Section 26 of whitli
provides that where a person dies being
"bound by contract in writing to assign, transfer or deliver any personal property, shares or
capital stock, bonds or other choses in action
and where the decedent if living "might be curu·
pelled to make such conveyance, assignment
transfer or deliver such personal property, share!
of capital stock, bonds or other choses in action. ·
to the person entitled thereto."
Under a similar statute the Idaho Supreme Court
has held that the correct procedure is not by filing a
claim but by application to the probate court for a decree. Blake vs. Lemp, 32 Idaho 158, 179 Pac. 737.
The subject of presentation of claims before bring·
ing action is annotated at 34 A.L.R. 362, in which it ti
said at page 383 as the general rule:

"It has been held that a statute requiring pre ·
sentation of a claim does not apply where thr :
claim is one for the recovery of specific property.
to which a number of cases are cited. And at page 38i
it is stated also that a suit to compel specific performance
does not require the filing of a claim as a prerequisite.
It was also held by the District Court that the bant
stock belongs to Dale Clark as a matter of agreement
on March 22, 1968, which was a present contract trans
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ferring the stock to Dale, but reserving the right of A.
L. Clark to use it and to hold title until his death and
precluding him from making any use of the stock inconsistent with the sale to Dale, or of delivering any of
the stock to any other person or agreeing so to do. The
is now in a position where it must dispose of the
bank stock and it is precluded by the contract of A. L.
Clark from disposing of it to any person other than
Dale D. Clark. If A. L. Clark were living and desired
lo dispose of the stock he could be compelled by Dale
!J. Clark to deliver the stock to him and to no other
person in exchange for which the payment would be
made.

To support the proposition that A. L. Clark during
his lifetime was not required to do anything under this
agreement, the objectors at page 7 include the following
citations:
"In Wilson v. Fackrell, 34 P. 2d 409 (Idaho
1934), the Court held that 'in order for appellant

to be entitled to relief sought the proof must
show the decedent was bound, by contract in
writing, to convey . . . and that it was such a
contract that he, if living might be compelled to
make the conveyance.' 34 Pac. 2d at 411. See
also In re Lewis Estate, 98 P .2d 654 (Wash.
1940) ."

These two cases have no support for the appellants
but rather support the position of respondent. The language quoted in appellants' Brief at page 16 is indeed
language founrl. in the opinion in Wilson vs. Fackrell,
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but it is simply a paraphrase of the statute in Idak
which is Section 15-1001 and is similar to the Ltai.
statute, except that the Idaho statute is limited to real
t
estate. The facts in Wilson were that one :Fackrell prl·
pared a contract of sale to his sister, Annie F. Wilson.
p
calling for sale of property for $2,000.00, endorsed uu
the back of it a receipt for $2,000.00 and put both inai1 •
envelope which he handed to the "grantee." The sister
did not read the contract, did not sign it, and did 110:
know what it contained until after the death of Fatk·
rell. The District Court, upon trial as a Probate Court
refused specific performance, holding that \\Tilson hac
shown only an executory contract and not an enforceable contract. The Supreme Court held that there wa1
a completed gift inter vivos and therefore an execute1\
contract which was enforceable and indicated by lht
opinion and by the authorities cited therein that it 11
the obligation of the Court to carry out the indicatrc
intention of the deceased if possible and ordered a nf11
trial on that theory.

In re Lewis Estate likewise is a holding that the
intention of the deceased shall be carried out. Thert
the owners of property made a conveyance and took a
mortgage back providing for payment by installmenb
with the provision that if any sum remained due ani!
owing upon the death of the grantor-mortgagee th'.
note and mortgage should be declared null and yoid
The issue arose in the Probate Court on whether thi
mortgage was valid or should be cancelled by the e:-.ecu
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tor who was also the "mortgagor." The executor had
cancelled the mortgage with approval of the Court, and
then upon objections of creditors the Court had reierse<l itself and ordered the mortgage reinstated and
paid. From this an appeal was taken and the Supreme
Court again reversed and held that the mortgage was
properly cancelled and that the provision of the contract
that the balance should be cancelled as to any amount
remaining upon the death of grantor was an enforceable proYision. The Court carefully reviews other cases,
riewing the problem as an unusual one. The Court
concludes:
"In this case it is clear from the initial agreement and all the subsequent instruments that
the dominant purpose of the decedent was to
enter into a contract for the sale of his property
on definitely expressed terms. There was consideration for the contract, and mutual performance by the parties. 'Ve see no reason why persons should not enter into such an undertaking
nor any reason why the Court should interfere
with their expressed intention, in the absence of
any fraud * * *. Had the note and mortgage
been fully paid before death, satisfaction of record could have been compelled by the party entitled thereto under the contract. Since the decedent's death marked the termination of the
obligation under the contract, the appellant was
entitled to the same relief." (Page 658 of 98
P.2d).

It is uot a prerequisite to stating a claim for specific
Ptrformanee against an estate to allege that the peti-

11

I
tioner filed a claim before filing the petition or before
bringing an action for a specific performance.

!

In Gammon vs. Bunnell, 22 U 421, 64 P. 948, the !
case was heard on the demurrer to the complaint. Tfie !
District Court held and the Supreme Court affirmed '
that a cause of action was stated in a complaint for 3
specific performance which alleged the filing of a pPtj.
tion in the Probate Court and the dismissal there without prejudice and the essential elements of the claim •
for specific performance on the merits. There was no i
allegation of filing a claim with the exceutor or in the :
estate. Likewise, in Free vs. Little, 31 U 449, 88 P
407, the Court ruled that a specific performance action
was not maintainable where there had not first
petition filed with the Probate Court and denied there
without prejudice, with no statement as to a require·
ment of first filing a claim in the Probate Court.
POINT 2
THE ISSUE OF SPECIFIC PERFORM·•
ANCE 'VAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE DIS·
TRICT COURT.
Respondent's Point 6 urges that this issue was no!
timely raised, as the District Court held.
The Executor here filed a verified petition in suo·
stantial compliance wiht Section 75-11-27 U.C.A. 195,1.'
The District Court, with all parties represented,

12
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April 22, 1969, ordered the case to trial on the issue of
specific performance (Supplement record).
The appellants' Brief in its Point II chooses to call
this "a jurisdictional prerequisite." The only case cited
which is helpful on this subject is Rogers vs. Nichols,
i5 Utah 290, 284 P. 992. But that case was far from
the facts of this one. There an objection was made to
the final account of the executor in which it was suggested that title should be quieted to part of the property
and the Court granted specific performance to a coniract without any request therefor in any pleading.
There is no statement that no objection was made to
this conduct of the Court and nothing there is precedent
for the situation here where there have been pleadings
filed by the parties and merged in an order of the Court
ll'hich specifically states that the matter to be determined on the trial is "that this matter is to be considered
iJ). the parties and by the Court as a proceeding for the
specific performance of a contract of the Decedent and
is not a confirmation of a sale by the Executor under
the prorisions of 75-10-8, U.C.A. 1953." It thus appears
that with the acquiescence of the parties and after the
filing of pleadings the Court has made a determination
that the proceeding is under Section 75-11-26 and no
objection was made to that by any pleading or notice.
Furthermore, no time limit is dictated in Section
7.3-11-27 and if the Court regards the objection as timely
and as important, the petition can now be filed. The
ExPcutor has in effect waved the requirement of the

13

petition by itself filing a verified petition seekinig au.
thority to deliver the property.
POINT 3
THE AGREEl\IENT FOR SALE OF
STOCK IS NOT ILLUSORY AND IS NOT AN
OPTION, BUT A BINDING AGREEMENT.
The contract between A. L. Clark and his sou '
Dale D. Clark, executed March 22, 1968 is classifieJ
as a "bilateral" contract, which is defined as one in·
valving promises on the part of both parties thereto.
17 Am. J ur. 2d, Contracts Section 5, p. 339 - Restalt·
ment of Contracts, Section 12, Williston on Contracts,
ad ed., Sec. 13.
I

It is said in Manwill vs. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d, 433,
that in order to have a valid and binding contract, each
party must be bound to give some legal consideration
to the other by confering a benefit upon him or suffer·
ing a legal detriment at his request.

In this case each party gave to the other valuable
and binding consideration.
A. L. Clark received first what he requested ol
respondent, i.e. an agreed settlement of a lawsuit be·
tween Dale and one Howard S. Clark. Secondly, he
sold to Dale Clark 530 shares of stock of the DaYil I
County Bank for $60.00 per share reserving the right
to vote, control and own said stock for his lifetime or
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until he should be paid in full for said stocks following
tender and demand by him for payment.
To analyze this last consideration, A. L. Clark had
the right to hold said stock during his lifetime and by
the promises of respondent he could demand $60.00 a
share irrespective of whether the market value of said
stock fell below or rose above $60.00. This was the right
.\. L. Clark bargained for and respondent gave at the
time the contract was signed by both parties.
Without question, A. L. Clark sold this stock to
Dale D. Clark, reserving only for his lifetime a right
to rote the stock and control same. At his death his
reservation ended in accordance with the plain contract
language and then the stock upon payment of $31,800.00
1rould be delivered absolutely to respondent.
Dnle D. Clark by signing the contract was bound
to pay $31,800.00 for ,530 shares of stock of the Davis
County llank. He thereby assumed a market risk. If
the stock fell in value he would suffer disappointment,
ur if the stock increased in value he would realize a
bargain. He was bound to pay for the stock when his
father demanded payment or at his fa ther's death if no
demand had been made. He also gave up his position
in the adion against Howard S. Clark as bargained for
by his father. This was the essence of the contract.
'I

I.

This contract cannot be properly classified as an

option. Willislun on Contracts, 3d ed., Sec. 61A, thus

defines nn option: "A contract to keep an offer open,"
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and as involving an offer "which the offeror may not
withdraw until the expiration of the time fixed for !n,
reason that the promise is based on a consideration
And again, "The crux of the matter is the open di.i.
cretion of the optionee to take or to leave the proposal
"The obligation by which one binds himself to sell anil
leaves it discretionary with the other party to huy.''
Thus it is plain that the respondent had no op!iou
but was absolutely committed to pay the price when <le.
mantled or when A. L. Clark died. The seller did not
make an offer, which was kept open, but entered in!o
a binding agreement based on separate and indepenJ.
ent consideration and had on discretion as to who 11·a1
the owner of his stock but only as to the time when ht
would require payment which would automatically ne
required at his death if he chose to enjoy his
rights to the end.

The Agreement is Not Illusory.
In this case both parties were bound from the time
the contract was signed by the terms thereof, inasmuco
as the contract was given for mutual promises. Thu)
from the time the contract was signed it was a com·
pleted contract in that both parties were bound by all
the provisions thereof. It was executory only in part.
Respondent did not have the right to decide whether or
not he should purchase the stock. He had purchascJ
the stock with the reservation retained by his father.
The contract reads "A. L. Clark is the owner of j 211
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shares * * * which he agrees is sold to Dale D. Clark."
His father was bound by the contract having received
ialuable consideration therefor, and it was only by the
reservation of the lifetime rights that he held control
uf the stock during his lifetime. After his death this
reservation ended by the terms of the contract and the
rnntract gave full rights in the stock to Dale. In other
words. he conveyed a present right in the stock subject
to 11 life estate. (Conclusions of Law, 2 and 3, R-12).
At pages 17 and 18 the appellants cite four cases

to their argument that the agreement is illusory because
1t permits performance "only when it pleases" A. L.
Clark. On the contrary, A. L. Clark was bound by the
sale of stock to Dale Clark reserving the right to exercise the indicia of ownership only so long as he lived and
at his age the period from the date of agreement to the
11ncertai11 date of death was a reasonable period of time.
Death would certainly come and at death the reserved
rights would terminate and the only thing that left a
r·hoice to A. L. Clark was whether he would choose to
demand payment before death.
And in the meantime, A. L. Clark received the
consideration for which he bargained, viz., settlement
11f the intra-family lawsuit.
As to appellants' four cases: Tatsch vs. HamiltonEricksun Manufacturing Company, 76 NM 729, 418
P.2d .J.87 says, as to the point here at page 190:
"The fact that an acceptance was to become

effeetiYe only upon the happening of a condition
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does not prevent a binding contract from com'
.
. _of that conditiu:lliu
eff ect upon t h e h al?penmg
if
was the mamfested mtention of th
parties.
And, of course, that was not the manifested intenfo
of A. L. Clark and Dale Clark who made a bindiu
contract on the spot with time of delivery of stock an:
payment of money postponed until demand by A. L
Clark or his death, whichever would be sooner. Tnr
same language is used by the Utah Supreme Court w
R. J. Daurn Construction Cornpany vs. Child, 247 P.ia
817 at 820. The Court there observed that there wai
clearly no binding contract intended "unless and unW
the government awarded to appellant the general con·
tract." which does not apply to the instant case becam1
there was a binding contract both as to the stock anu
as to the lawsuit. In Lawrence Block Company Ii,
Palston, 266 P.2d 856 the Court found no binding con
tract because the offeree made a conditional acceplanu
under which he would be bound only if he approreJ
OPA rent statements and subject to his inspection ana
approval of all apartments, with no standards for eithe:
approval. The Court concluded that this "was not at
offer to enter into an agreement, but an offer to enter
into an agreement if he later wished to do so. Tni1
illusory promise is the only offer that was submitted bi·
plaintiff to defendant" which is again readily distill
guishable from the case at bar. And finally, J°l'JiflM!
Novelty Cornpany vs. United Manufacturing, DJ Fen,
Supp. 412 involves a contract with "a reasonable royal!!
11

1
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to be fixed later" which the Court found unenforceable
for uncertainty.

POINT 4
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF
STOCK DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A GIFT.
Appellants at page 21 argue from facts which are
uot in evidence. There is no evidence that the value
of the stock was greater than the sum that Dale Clark
agreed to pay and there is no evidence that there was
a gift of any kind involved in the agreement before
the Court. The settlement of the lawsuit was bargained
for on the face of the agreement, as well as by the precautionary acknowledgment stated on the back of
Exhibit B.
Respondent has at no time suggested that there
was a gift or has ever argued the principle of a gift
causa mortis as a substitute for delivery to a donee.

POINT 5
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF
STOCK IS NOT A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION.

The contract states that A. L. Clark agrees that
the 530 shares of the capital stock of the Davis County
Bauk are sold to Dale Clark. Upon signing the contraet he was not free to sell the stock to a third person
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or to bequeath it to anyone else. His control of tfit
stock was to exist only during his lifetime and en<leJ
with his death. Dale Clark, by the contract, was 01111
gated upon demand or at his father's death to pay fo,
the stock in cash and then obtain full indicia of owner.
ship and possession of the stock. There was no question
as to whether the stock was sold, and no option or rt·
served right in A. L. Clark to determine whether 1 1
not Dale would get the stock. His only right was t1J
determine when he would require payment, the amouul
of which was fixed by the contract.
This is not a situation where there was an open
offer of A. L. Clark awaiting acceptance. The bargaii
of the parties was for consideration which was exchangeu
and the stock was sold but Dale agreed that certai11
rights as to the stock could be exercised until he paio
in full for it.

Page on TV ills (Bowe-Parker Revision) , Sectio11
6.7, page 261, states this rule:
"If an instrument creates a right in the pro·
misee before the death of promisor, the inslru·
ment is a contract regardless of the date set for
performance."

A similar situation is with deeds containing provision'
limiting or postponing the grantee's rights until the
grantor's death. These are uniformly held to passa
· mereil'·
present interest to t h e grantee an d postponmg
his enjoyment thereof, subject to enjoyment of tni
grantor during his life. See annotation at 31 A.LR
20

zd, 53s, Section 5; Kimbler's Administrator vs. Sanford, 310 Ky. 66, 221 SW 2d 638; White vs. Wester,
'170 ok. 250, 39 P.2d 32; Patellis vs. Tanner, (1944)
19 7 Ga. 471, 29 SE 2d 419; Fonda vs. Miller, (1951)
JJl Ill. 74, 103 NE 2d 98; Mealtis vs. Kruckenberg,
l71 Kansas 450 233 Pac. 2d 472, 31 A.L.R. 2d 525.
In Nelley vs. First National Bank, 135 Ore. 409,

P. 721, a deed granted and conveyed personal
property which was construed as conveying a remainder
interest to the grantee. The provision in the deed that
the conveyance should not go into effect until after
grantor's death did not preclude the Court from holding that a present interest was created in the grantee.
293

McHenry vs. McHenry, 158 Ga. 105, 108 SE 522,
inrnlved an instrument which purported to give, grant
and convey certain shares of corporate stock to others,
hut reserved in maker the right to receive and use dividends declared thereon during his lifetime. The Court
said the reservation of the right to use the dividends
during grantor's life was inconsistent with the idea that
the instrument was testamentary in character.
An article in the :Michigan Law Review, Volume
entitled "When are Deeds Testamentary"
by Henry H. Ballantine a law professor in the Illinois
Unirersity, says that in the majority of states the language that the deed is "to be in force and effect from
and after the decease of grantor" is interpreted very
l'1b eral!y. Such language, he states, may be regarded
18, page 470,
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as representing a confusion of two events (I) the in
tent to give an estate to commence in futuro, but IJ,
reserve the possession, use and enjoyment of the pro.,
erty during grantor's lifetime, and ( 2) the intent;,1.1,,
make a present dispositive instrument, but to keep
deed ambulatory like a will during grantor's lifetiint
The probable intention is effectuated by holding th
instrument operative in praesenti as a grant of a future
estate.

Shackelton vs. Sefree, 86 Ill. 616 is relied upon
partly by the professor. In commenting on that cast.
the professor said
"In view of the act of delivery to the grantee
in the lifetime of grantor and the intention toot
gathered from the whole transaction the prori·
sion 'that title shall not pass until death' does not
mean that grantee shall acquire no right or li1·
terest under the deed until grantor's death. Tilt
deed conveys a vested interest to commence in
futuro and necessarily cuts down the estate re
maining in grantor."
So here, the agreement transferring the right was de·
livered to respondent passing present rights.
Another article is found in the Harvard Law Re
view, Volume 30, in a note on page 508. The facts art
as follows:
A signs, seals, records and delivers to B an
ment drawn in the form of a warranty deed
, I
Blackacre to B, and his heirs. Consideration reciteu
in deed. In the habendum clause is inserted "this deco
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isto take effect upon the death of grantor." The great
wajority of cases seem to take an intermediate position.
They hold the instrument to be a valid deed which apparently vests the fee in B at once, with the enjoyment
thereof postponed until A's death, with more or less
i:iguely defined "life estate" reserved "by implication"
or by operation of law in A. If the clause had read "The
estate to vest" instead of "deed to take effect" it would
seem impossible in the author's view to have questioned
its validity. In Note 4 of this article, many cases are
cited as supporting the majority view.
In Frawley vs. Forrest, 310 Mass. 446; 38 NE 2
li81, 138 ALR 999, the deed reserved to the grantor and
her husband a life estate during the lifetime of either
or both of them. This reservation operated to give the
grantor a life estate and by operation of law to give a
remainder in the plaintiff who was a grantee. This remainder was an immediate interest.

SUMMARY
Respondent submits that the attack on the formal
insufficiency of the petition for right of specific performance is not timely, having been acquiesced in by
the parties and made plain by the order of Judge Swan
11 f April 28.
Respondent takes the position that the necessity for
tiling a daim is also not properly before the Court as
nut timely raised; but more importantly, this proceeding
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is not governed by Section 75-9-1, but by Section ../,)
11-26, UCA 1953.
The agreement between the respondent and ·
father was a binding bilateral contract by which a pn
sent interest was transferred to the respondent for·
promised price and by which the deceased had
benefit for which he bargained, namely settlement 0
the family litigation.
The intentions of the parties to the contract wt
clear and unambiguous; the executor of the estate
prepared to go forward and raises no objection to ]lt!
f ormance of the contract as ordered by the Dis ·
Court.
The order of the District Court should be affirm
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR
Of Richards & 'Vatkins
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll
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